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Service of Process Abroad - Is There
Anything Left of the Hague Service
Convention After Volkswagenwerk
A.G. v. Schlunk?
There is nothing more likely to start disagreement among people or
countries than an agreement.'
I. INTRODUCTION
As international trade increases, countries realize that their sta-
tus among nations may well be judged by the strength of their econ-
omy. This world view of economics has spawned a theory that
economics has replaced war as the vehicle for competition among na-
tions. A noted humorist went so far as to state that a Japanese trade
delegate had told him, "[b]ecause of our economic strength, in the
future the United States will be our farm and Europe will be our bou-
tique."'2 Whether the above statement is viewed as an anecdote or a
challenge, the new emphasis on international economics has led to a
re-examination by United States courts of international law and its
practical applications.
3
One major force in promulgating international law has been the
1. E.B. WHITE, My Day, ONE MAN'S MEAT 56 (1944), quoted in Brief for the Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., and the Product Liability Advi-
sory Council, Inc. as amici curiae at 1, Volkswagenwerk A. G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104
(1988).
2. Gore Vidal on The Tonight Show, Starring Johnny Carson (NBC television broadcast,
Nov. 18, 1988). Vidal added: "This quote was overheard at a trade summit in Moscow. When
the delegate from the Soviet Union parried this somewhat humorous quote with the question
'And what do you think Russia will be?', the Japanese delegate answered, 'We don't think of
you.' ,
3. Recently, the doctrines of foreign sovereign immunity, enforcement of choice of fo-
rum provisions in contracts, the act of state doctrine, and the extraterritorial enforcement of
United States laws have been given either judicial formation or review. See Zedan v. Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (foreign sovereign immunity); The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (forum selection clauses); Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (act of state doctrine); Timberlane Lumber Co.
v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976) (extraterritorial enforcement of
United States antitrust law).
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Hague Conference on International Law.4 The subject of this Note
concerns one of the Conference's progeny, the Hague Service Conven-
tion ("the Convention"), 5 and its recent interpretation by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Volkswagenwerk A.G. v.
Schlunk.
6
The United States signed the Convention in 1967, and it entered
into force on February 10, 1969.7 In international litigation, chal-
lenges to proper jurisdiction and service are common tactics., In re-
sponse, the Convention promised to alleviate at least a portion of the
litigation on service issues by providing a uniform procedure for inter-
national service. In the United States, some confusion arose among
various state and federal courts regarding whether the Convention
was the exclusive method of serving process on foreign defendants
abroad. 9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Schlunk in an attempt to resolve the split of opinion on this issue.
The Schlunk case presented a classic service problem. A Volk-
swagen Rabbit involved in an auto accident in Illinois resulted in a
products liability suit against Volkswagen of Germany ("VWAG").
The plaintiff served Volkswagen of America ("VWOA") in Illinois as
VWAG's agent, pursuant to Illinois law. An immediate dispute arose
over whether service should have been made under Illinois service
methods or by the service methods provided for in the Convention.
VWAG argued that service should be quashed because it did not con-
form to Convention rules. However, at every level, the Illinois state
courts rejected VWAG's position and found that Illinois' method of
service was proper. VWAG successfully petitioned the United States
4. For a good introduction to the Hague Conference, see Reese, The Hague Conference
on Private International Law: Some Observations, 19 INT'L LAW. 881 (1985).
5. Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638
(entered into force in the United States Feb. 10, 1969) [hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
6. 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988).
7. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5.
8. Contributing factors to the frequent challenges to service are the different methods of
service used by various countries. See Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural
Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953).
9. Compare Cipolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, Inc., 496 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1985); Vorhees v.
Fisher & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1983); Harris v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chem.
Servs., Inc., 100 F.R.D. 775 (M.D. La. 1984), with Exparte Volkswagenwerk A.G., 443 So. 2d
880 (1983); Zisman v. Singer, 106 F.R.D. 194 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk
A.G., 104 F.R.D. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1985); McHugh v. Int'l Components Corp., 118 Misc.2d 489,
461 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1983)."
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Supreme Court for certiorari.' 0
The Illinois state courts validated service primarily because
VWAG and VWOA were so closely related as to be virtual alter egos
of each other. Since VWAG was thus "present" in Illinois, service
was proper because "service abroad" had not been necessary, allowing
the Convention requirements to remain dormant. I I The United States
Supreme Court, not content to simply affirm the reasoning of the state
courts, went one step further in its analysis. The Supreme Court held
that the law of the forum state will determine whether a particular
"service situation" constitutes "service abroad." 12 The Court's rea-
soning upheld the state courts' findings of proper service on two theo-
ries. First, the relationship between VWAG and VWOA was
sufficiently close as to avoid offending the traditional "notice" require-
ment of due process. 13 Second, the Supreme Court added the doctri-
nal theory that the Illinois service statute, not the relationship of
VWAG to VWOA, was the controlling factor in determining whether
to apply the Convention.
14
This new doctrine, which could be labelled "forum law determi-
nation," requires examination. Although finding service to be proper
may have been the correct result based on the facts of the case, the
Court's rationale creates the possibility of using many types of insuffi-
cient service methods which the Convention had sought to prevent.
Moreover, this doctrine adds little or no improvement to United
States law. 15 To begin with, this Note analyzes the constitutional re-
quirements for service of process in the United States, the Conven-
tion's service requirements, and the problems with international
service in general. Next, this Note analyzes and critiques the Schlunk
case as unnecessarily degrading the Convention and its policy, and as
a decision containing circular reasoning and raising a possible consti-
10. 108 S. Ct. at 2106-07.
11. Id. For a complete discussion of the relationship between VWOA and VWAG, see
Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 145 Ill. App. 3d 594, 503 N.E.2d 1045 (1986).
12. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112 (1988).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. In 1978, Lawrence Tribe wrote, "I do not regard the rulings of the Supreme Court as
synonymous with constitutional truth." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vii (2d
ed. 1988). In an era of routine denial of certiorari to an endless number of cases of great
importance, at a minimum, the Supreme Court should endeavor to clarify and improve United
States law in the cases it does take. Though this Note focuses primarily on legal analysis, the
reader should also consider whether, by ruling as it did in Schlunk, the Court satisfied its
responsibility as the final arbiter of United States law.
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tutional law problem in its application. This Note concludes that the
Schlunk decision may have been correct on its facts and merits, but
the ramifications of the Court's rationale may lead to an inconsistency
of notice in international litigation. Finally, this Note proposes an
alternative test for applicability of the Convention based on standard
due process analysis.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A threshold requirement of international litigation is proper ser-
vice of process on a foreign defendant. 16 In federal court, process is
served pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 17
Rule 4 requires service to follow the particular rules of service of the
forum state. '8 State courts follow their own rules of service subject, of
course, to due process standards established by the Supreme Court
regarding notice. 19 Although these service and notice requirements
initially appear simple, cases which involve parties from different
states or countries often spawn complex conflict of law choices re-
garding which method of service to use in a particular situation.20
Service and notice issues provide the first chance for a defendant
to challenge the plaintiff, and perhaps quash service. 21 Because the
trial cannot progress until all of the service and notice issues are set-
tled, challenging service can result in a long delay before the merits of
the dispute are reached. This delay could benefit the defendant be-
cause it might result in an outright victory if the statute of limitations
runs before the plaintiff can successfully serve the defendant. 22
16. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 164-79 (1985). For
an excellent discussion of the federal rules of service in general, and how the applications can
quickly become complex, see J. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 47-61 (1987).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 4.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(C)(2)(i) provides: "A summons and complaint may be served upon
a defendant... pursuant to the law of the State in which the district court is held ...."
19. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), and notes 28-36
infra, and accompanying text.
20. See J. GLANNON, supra note 16, for examples in the domestic arena. See G. BORN &
D. WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 119-69 (1989)
for international examples.
21. Although the plaintiff can always subsequently serve the defendant in the correct
manner, there could be a statute of limitations problem.
22. Because a delay which results in the statute of limitations running could lead to the
suit being filed in a non-United States forum, the "outright victory" could be achieved if all
possible forum statutes of limitations have run or if the option of beginning the suit anew in a
foreign forum is not practicable. Thus, at least one court has allowed the plaintiff to "re-serve"
the defendant under the Convention, regardless of the time elapsed. Vorhees v. Fischer &
Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 576 (4th Cir. 1983). Moreover, the option of the plaintiff taking a
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A. The Mullane Standard.
Although the practical problem of Schlunk has international fla-
vor, the initial legal problem is grounded in the domestic concept of
legal notice. The law of the United States, with its constitutional em-
phasis on due process, has always regarded service of process and no-
tice as important concepts. When the modern standard of minimum
contacts23 replaced presence as the benchmark for personal jurisdic-
tion, new standards were required for service and notice in order to
safeguard those parties haled into jurisdictions in distant forums. Be-
cause the new standards are based on constitutional law and are thus
binding on all federal and state courts, they apply to cases involving
service of process on foreign defendants.
24
The United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutional
standards for notice in the seminal case of Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. 25 In Mullane, a bank formed a common trust fund
under New York banking law, 2 6 and after acquiring the membership
of 113 smaller trusts, petitioned the New York Surrogate Court 27 for
an accounting and settlement of the common trust for the first trust
period. The accounting is an important event in the management of
any trust fund, especially for the beneficiaries. 28 The trustee complied
with the notice requirements of New York law by publishing an an-
nouncement in a New York newspaper. The announcement did not
list the names of all the individuals who would be affected by the
trust, but rather contained only the name of the bank and the names
default judgment may not be the end of the suit. An additional problem is the "enforcement
game," where enforcement can prove to be more onerous than obtaining the judgment.
23. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), was the landmark case which
introduced new, broader concepts of personal jurisdiction based on "minimum contacts" with
a forum as opposed to "presence" in the forum. The result of International Shoe has been a
steady expansion of personal jurisdiction, which has roughly coincided with ease of modern
travel.
24. For example, one state has held that the due process clause requires notice of suit to
be written in the language of the jurisdiction in which he is served. Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal.
App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972).
25. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
26. Id. at 307.
27. "In New York, the Surrogate's Court has jurisdiction over all actions and proceed-
ings relating to the affairs of decedents, probate of wills, administration of estates.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1296 (5th ed. 1979).
28. Once the fiduciary settles or accounts for trust funds for a specific time period, all of
the beneficiaries of the trust will have waived any claims (such as mismanagement) against the
fiduciary arising from the accounting period. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309. Consequently, notice
of an accounting is of paramount importance to the beneficiaries of the trust.
19891
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of each trust agreement. 29 After he was appointed special guardian of
the interests of all possible known beneficiaries of the 113 smaller
trusts, Mullane challenged the New York notice provisions which al-
lowed for publication alone without any other effort at contact. 30
Mullane based the challenge on possible constitutional problems with
notice and service. 3
1
The New York Court of Appeals held that the notice by publica-
tion sufficiently met Fourteenth Amendment requirements of proce-
dural due process. 32 Mullane then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.13 The Court held: "[a]n ele-
mentary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceed-
ing which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances to apprise the interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. ' 34 Applying this rule to the facts, the Court found
that where the trustee knew of a beneficiary's address, due process
would, at a minimum, require notice by mail. Publication would only
suffice for unknown beneficiaries. 35
Although the Mullane rule arose from a case involving published
notice to claimants, it has been extended analytically to service on
defendants. The rule is most applicable to Schlunk when stated
broadly: a statutory notice provision not meeting the minimum re-
quirements of due process is unconstitutional.36 The Convention is a
statutory notice provision, as was the Illinois service statute examined
in Schlunk and the New York law examined in Mullane. Thus, the
first key to understanding the true import of Schlunk is a recognition
that any service situation or statute must always comport with due
process standards.
37
29. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 309-10 (1950).
30. Id. at 311.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 307.
33. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 provides for appeal to the Supreme Court, from, inter alia, a
state high court decision whose validity is questioned on the ground of its being repugnant to
the Constitution.
34. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
35. Id. at 317-18.
36. Id. at 320.
37. For a discussion of the various permutations of service and whether a particular
method has been held constitutional, see J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra
note 16, at 164-72.
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B. International Service of Process and the Hague Convention
While the legal system of the United States was attempting to
solve domestic notice problems using the Mullane rule, the interna-
tional legal community was grappling with the same problem. Histor-
ically, there have been many ways of serving process abroad.
Litigants in the United States and other countries have had to choose
which method of service to use when serving foreign defendants. 38
The choice often fell on the plaintiff's attorney in the common law
jurisdictions, 39 and it was thus not surprising that various methods of
international service developed. However, one of the historic disad-
vantages of having attorneys make individual decisions regarding ser-
vice in international cases is that different countries have different
ideas of what procedure should be used at the pre-trial4° stage in gen-
eral and to serve process in particular. 4 1
For example, countries following a civil law system regard the
court and judge as the primary organ of judicial power, frowning on
the accepted common law method of allowing the attorneys free reign
over service.42 Common law attorneys may be cited for contempt in a
civil law court if they persist in using common law methods of service,
discovery and subpoena.43 On the other hand, civil law attorneys can
be frustrated when attempted service sent to a government official in a
common law jurisdiction is delayed in transit and results in lack of
notice to the actual defendant.
Perhaps the international version of the New York banking law
(which provided the catalyst for Mullane) is the French service
method of notification au parquet.44 In notification au parquet, service
is deemed complete when it is placed in the hands of an appointed
official in the plaintiff's forum, regardless of whether the official actu-
ally notifies the defendant of the suit either by mailing or handing
38. G. BORN & D. WESTIN, supra note 20.
39. See, e.g., California Code of Civil Procedure Section 413.10, infra note 108.
40. For example, the common and civil law systems have two completely diverse ways of
conducting a deposition. In the United States common law system, the deposition will most
likely take place in the lawyer's office, while in a civil law country, the deposition can only take
place in the courtroom. The civil law systems follow this procedure because they "do not
share the Anglo-American notion of a trial as a separate, isolated episode," and require the
judge to conduct all relevant procedure. Jones, supra note 8, at 527-28.
41. G. BORN & D. WESTIN, supra note 20, at 119-36.
42. Id. at 127-32.
43. Id.
44. Discussed in Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2110 (1988).
1989]
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over the service documents. 45  When notification au parquet at-
tempted to cross common and civil law boundaries, it frequently re-
sulted in lack of notice to defendants, default judgments, and the
inability to enforce judgments abroad because of the hostility of the
defendant's forum.
46
Because the common law jurisdictions generally disliked notifica-
tion au parquet and because the use of United States methods of direct
service or alternative methods of service such as letters rogatory47 had
yielded inconsistent results,48 the member states of the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law 49 convened to address the problem.
The result was the Hague Service Convention. The United States
took an active part in drafting and ratifying the Convention because
the agreement promised to bring foreign methods of service in line
with accepted United States standards of due process. 50 The United
States ratified the Convention in 1969. By 1988, many leading indus-
trial nations were signatories. 5'
When the United States ratified the Convention, an observer of
the law of international service might have thought that all of the
conflicts had been put to rest. The Convention provides several basic
methods for service of process,5 2 none of which are especially onerous
when examined in light of United States' standards. The primary
45. S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1967) (statement of Phillip Amram,
member of United States delegation to the Hague Convention).
46. Id.
47. Letters rogatory are a "request by one court of another court in an independent juris-
diction .... BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (5th ed. 1979). In the absence of a treaty, many
United States courts were reluctant to use letters rogatory, as the success or failure of the
request rested entirely upon grounds of international comity. See 1 B. RISTAU, INTERNA-
TIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE 3-4 (1984).
48. G. BORN & D. WESTIN, supra note 20, at 136.
49. The Hague Convention has also promulgated other international treaties, discussed in
Reese, supra note 4.
50. See 1 B. RISTAU, supra note 47, at 4-13 for a summary of United States participation
in international efforts to codify the international law of service.
51. Antigua, Barbuda, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt,
Finland, France, Germany (Fed. Rep.), Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malawi,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States. See appendix to FED. R. CIV. P. 4; 28 U.S.C.A. § 210 (1988 supp.).
52. The primary method, set out in Articles 2 through 6 of the Convention, is to forward
the service documents to a designated Central Authority in the target country, whereupon the
Central Authority effects service. See Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, arts. 2-6, at
362. Article 5 of the Convention allows the Central Authority to simply mail the documents
to the intended recipient. Id. For an analysis of all the possible methods of service allowable
under the Convention, see Note, International Service of Process: A Guide to Serving Process
Abroad Under the Hague Convention, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 287 (1986).
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method, for example, requires the plaintiff to send the documents to a
designated central authority in the defendant's country. 53 However, it
is not clear to which cases and situations the Convention applies. The
Convention simply states that it applies to: "all cases, in civil or com-
mercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or ex-
trajudicial document for service abroad. ' 54  The drafters of the
Convention left this phrase somewhat open-ended and undefined. 5
As an enforceable treaty of the United States, the Convention
will pre-empt state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause in the
United States Constitution.56 No controversy exists on this point.
However, doubt has arisen over the scope of the Convention's appli-
cation due to various United States courts' interpretations of the "ser-
vice abroad" language.57  Thus, although the international
community has agreed on a treaty to handle the same problem which
the Supreme Court confronted in Mullane, the uncertainty regarding
the correct method for international service persists in this country
because the various United States jurisdictions have been unable to
agree on the scope of the Convention.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
It is against this background that the Schlunk case arose. Her-
wig Schlunk's parents were killed when their 1978 Volkswagen
Rabbit collided head-on with another car driven by Dennis Reed in
Cook County, Illinois. 58 Schlunk filed suit in state court in Illinois,
alleging design defects in the car.59 He initially served VWOA
through C.T. Corporation, its designated agent as required for service
of process in Illinois. 6° Later, Schlunk amended his complaint to in-
clude VWAG as a defendant. 61
VWAG entered a special and limited appearance to quash ser-
53. Hague Service Convention, supra note 5, arts. 2-6, at 362-63.
54. Id. art. 1, at 362.
55. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2108-09 (1988).
56. Id. at 2108. Cf Vorhees v. Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 575 (4th Cir. 1983). See
also discussion in text part V, section B, infra.
57. Compare notes 9 and 10, supra.
58. Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent at 4, Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S.
Ct. 2104 (1988). Reed's negligence was one cause of the death of Schlunk's parents. Reed did
not appear and an order of default was entered against him. Id. at 4-5.
59. Id. at 4; Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2106 (1988).
60. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 145 Il1. App. 3d 594, 503 N.E.2d 1045 (1986).
61. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2106.
1989]
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vice.62 The trial court determined that service was sufficient under
the Illinois Code, and found no conflict with the Convention due to
the close relationship between VWOA and VWAG.
63
The case then moved to the Illinois Court of Appeals, where
VWAG lost again. 64 The Court of Appeals' reasoning consisted of
two prongs. First, it found that because VWAG was present in Illi-
nois through its agent, VWOA, the Convention would not apply. 65
The court stated that "[e]ven if the intended recipient is standing right
next to him, a process server, according to VWAG, would have to
send a summons off to West Germany.
'66
Second, to support the theory that VWAG was in fact "present"
in Illinois, the state court set forth a detailed analysis of the connec-
tions between the two companies. It compared cases in which pres-
ence was the issue and took care to distinguish "presence" under a
service statute from "presence" for personal jurisdiction purposes.
67
The court concluded that since VWAG was present in Illinois
through its alter ego and agent, VWOA, service was proper, and the
Convention was not an issue. 68 When the Supreme Court of Illinois
62. Id. This was not the first time that VWAG had attempted to challenge service in a
products liability case. See Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 104 F.R.D. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1985);
Richardson v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 552 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Cipolla v. Picard
Porsche Audi, Inc., 496 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1985); Exparte Volkswagenwerk A.G., 443 So. 2d 880
(Ala. 1983); Dr. Ing H.C.F. Porsche v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 755, 177 Cal. Rptr.
155 (1981). This trail of cases is one example of why a more usable doctrine should have been
formulated in Schlunk.
63. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 145 Ill. App. 3d at 608, 503 N.E.2d at 1054.
64. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2107.
65. Id. The "presence" argument is perhaps the most persuasive way to avoid applica-
tion of the Convention. The simplicity of this doctrine which exists when a non-resident de-
fendant or its agent is present in the forum and, thus amenable to service, makes the
alternative doctrine of forum law determination all the more questionable.
66. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 145 I11. App. 3d 594, 597, 503 N.E.2d 1045, 1047
(1986).
67. Id. "Presence" for purposes of service is actually a prerequisite to personal jurisdic-
tion. Although a corporation may transact business in a given state, and thus have minimum
contacts with that state sufficient to support jurisdiction, it may not have an agent "present" to
accept service in that state. VWAG did not question its minimum contacts with Illinois, only
its presence for service. Thus, the applicability of transient personal jurisdiction to a foreign
defendant is a completely separate issue, because in personal jurisdiction, the focus is on the
contacts within the forum state and not the details of service. For a recent discussion of
whether or not transient personal jurisdiction can still be obtained by simply serving a party
who is temporarily in the forum, see Amusement Equipment Co. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264
(5th Cir. 1985) (transient personal jurisdiction is still permissible as long as exercise of jurisdic-
tion is "ethical, not onerous, and fair, not oppressive.").
68. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 145 Ill. App. 3d at 608, 503 N.E.2d at 1054.
326
Service of Process Abroad
denied leave to appeal, 69 VWAG petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for certiorari.70 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to resolve a conflict among the circuits concerning whether the
Convention should apply to cases involving service on domestic sub-
sidiaries of foreign corporations. 7'
Although the Illinois courts had used the relationship between
the companies as the primary ground for holding service to be
proper, 72 the Supreme Court affirmed on a broader ground. The
Court found that the Convention did not apply in this case because,
according to Illinois law, this was not a case where "service abroad"
was necessary. 73 Hence, service under Illinois law had been proper.74
This holding thus added a doctrine of "forum law determination"
(i.e., the issue of whether "service abroad" is necessary is determined
and defined by state law) to international service situations involving
the Convention.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING
The Court saw the Schlunk case as an opportunity to define the
scope of the Convention and began its analysis with a review of the
Convention's negotiation history. 75 The majority of the Court framed
the issue as one of statutory interpretation as opposed to fictional
"presence. '76 The Court determined that the drafters of the Conven-
tion had left the definition of "service abroad" to be interpreted by the
various countries that signed the treaty, thus leaving a void which the
Court believed needed to be filled. 77
The majority began its analysis with the premise that because the
Convention is a treaty of the United States, there is no doubt that the
Convention would pre-empt any conflicting state law. 78 Thus, unlike
the holding of Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. Dist. Ct. ,79
(which interpreted the Hague Discovery Convention as an optional
method of discovery) the Court held that the Hague Service Conven-
69. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2107 (1988).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 145 Ill. App. 3d 594, 503 N.E.2d 1045 (1986).
73. Volkswagnewerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2112 (1988).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2108-09.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2110.
78. Id. at 2108.
79. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
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tion serves as the exclusive method of service of process for interna-
tional litigation to which it applies. 80 However, the problem remained
in determining when such an exclusive situation might arise.
Although "service of process" was well-defined, "service abroad" had
no definable legal meaning. 81 Obviously, the task was to find a test
that could be applied in deciding when a particular "service" would
have to be "abroad," thereby triggering the Convention. On this
point, the Court noted that "[t]he legal sufficiency of a formal delivery
of documents must be measured against some standard.1
8 2
To find that standard, the majority made some rather astounding
leaps of logic. It pointed out that "[as] [t]he Convention itself does
not prescribe a standard .... we almost necessarily must refer to the
internal law of the forum state."8s3 It was not explained why looking
at the internal law of the forum state should be so "necessary." Dur-
ing the thirty-eight years since Mullane, United States courts had
been required to look at the facts of each case to determine whether
notice was constitutionally adequate.8 4 If a court found a particular
procedure inadequate, it was free to prescribe what it felt were proper
methods of service. If this analysis was followed, the service issue in
Schlunk could have been resolved by comparing the Illinois service
statute to the Convention in order to determine whether VWAG had
adequate notice. But the Court chose a different route. Completely
avoiding a due process path, the Court contended that the first step in
this analysis should be to look at the forum's law.
8 5
To buttress this argument, the majority focused almost entirely
on the legislative history of the Convention.8 6 This analysis was two-
fold. First, the Court noted that the drafters had intentionally used
the legally narrow term signification (service) as opposed to a broader
term, notification (notice).8 7 The Court inferred that in the present
situation, VWAG had been "served" in Illinois, and only the "notice"
had been sent to Germany. Since the drafters had made it a point to
say the Convention only applied to "service," there was at least some
80. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2108.
81. 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2108.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 16.
85. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2108 (1988).
86. Id. at 2108-09.
87. Id. at 2109.
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chance that they would limit the Convention when there was no "ser-
vice" actually sent abroad.
Second, the Court examined quotations from the Yugoslavian
and Dutch delegates which supported a view that the law of the fo-
rum state be used to determine the scope of the Convention.88 In view
of these factors, the Court concluded the internal law of the forum
would determine the scope of the Convention.8 9
Although there was some support for this position, it was equally
plausible that the Convention drafting committee's references to the
"forum's internal law" referred to the types of cases to which the
Convention would apply (i.e. civil, maritime, or commercial), not to
the basic applicability of the Convention.90
There had been no mention of the Convention's legislative his-
tory in the Illinois state court decisions, and it is interesting to note
that the Illinois courts seemed to go to great lengths to avoid such a
rationale. The Illinois appellate court felt that VWAG was simply
present in Illinois, and rejected VWAG's attempts to define the issue
as a test of the scope of the Convention. The court stated: "VWAG
seems to suggest that, under the Convention, one cannot serve West
German residents pursuant to Illinois law even when they are in Illi-
nois." 91 This feeling was echoed in Schlunk's brief, in which he noted
that, after losing "an essentially factual argument in the Illinois courts
as to its relationship with its wholly-owned subsidiary, petitioner at-
tempts to manufacture an issue for review ... where none exists."'92
VWAG still had one potent argument left. Because any argu-
ment based on the legal scope of the Convention seemed doomed to
fail, VWAG raised a factual comparison. Looking again to the legis-
lative history of the Convention, VWAG emphasized that the framers
of the Convention specifically noted that certain forms of service
would no longer be sufficient once the Convention was in force. One
of these methods was notification au parquet,93 which looked very
similar to the type of substituted service on an agent which had oc-
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2110.
90. G. BORN & D. WESTIN, supra note 20, at 138-39.
91. Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 145 I11. App. 3d 594, 597, 503 N.E.2d 1045, 1047
(1986).
92. Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 2, Volkswagenwerk
A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104 (1988).
93. For a discussion of notification au parquet, see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying
text.
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curred in this case.94
The Illinois state courts completely avoided this counterargu-
ment by basing their holdings on the "presence" in Illinois of VWAG
through VWOA. Rather than adopt the state court's reasoning, the
majority maintained its "forum law determination" position by claim-
ing to have issued a narrow holding. Specifically, the Court stated
that "this statement (VWAG's reference to the similarities betweU
notification au parquet and the instant case) might affect our decision
as to whether the Convention applies to notification au parquet,.
[but this is] an issue we do not resolve today." 95
Unfortunately, at certain points in the opinion the majority
seemed to lose track of the basis for its argument. The majority
seemed to waver between whether it felt that the actual method of
service was legally sufficient because of the newly announced theory
of forum law determination, or whether it was the close relationship
of VWAG and VWOA which made this case comport with due pro-
cess. The Court seemed to endorse the view of the Illinois courts
when it stated, "there is no comparable evidence in the negotiating
history that the Convention was meant to apply to substituted service
on a subsidiary like VWOA, which clearly does not require service
abroad under the forum's internal law.
' 96
Many law students are taught that they should be very careful in
legal writing when using the word "clearly," because it is sure to alert
the reader to a possible problem with one's contention.97 This instance
was no exception. After formulating the forum law determination
theory on the grounds of the "clear" intent of the drafters, the major-
ity admitted that due process would not be offended in United States
courts by the Schlunk rationale. According to the majority, "forum
law determination" did not purport to overrule the Mullane standard,
"notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." 98 Thus, despite the new
94. See Schlunk v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 145 Il. App. 3d 594, 503 N.E.2d 1045, 1045-
46 (1986) for more details of the initial service in this case.
95. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2110.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Thanks to Professor John Calmore for his erudite statement of the principle of using
"clearly" to mask actual lack of clarity. Professor Calmore expounded on this principle in his
Spring 1988 Torts-Writing class at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, California.
98. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2111, citing Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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Schlunk rationale, the only apparent reason that the Convention
"clearly" did not apply here was because an application of the Mul-
lane standard (as used by the Illinois courts) resulted in a finding of
adequate notice because agency theory supported the conclusion that
VWAG was actually present in Illinois through VWOA.
The majority concluded its opinion with a rebuttal to VWAG's
argument that the decision would lead to widespread non-observance
of the Convention by other countries. The Court stated, "[w]e do not
think that this country, or any other country, will draft its internal
laws deliberately so as to circumvent the Convention in cases in which
it would be appropriate to transmit judicial documents for service
abroad." 99
The concurring opinion, by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, attacked this reasoning. They found that VWOA was
VWAG's direct and close agent in the forum, and perhaps its alter ego
as well. As such, service on VWOA satisfied due process standards
for adequate notice to VWAG.' °° Because courts in this country are
bound by due process standards of notice, the real issue should be
whether a state statute can actually "define" service abroad if the defi-
nition chosen (e.g. service is complete on presentation to an involun-
tary local agent regardless of the principle's domiciliary or
relationship with the agent) would result in inadequate notice.101 If a
state did not have this power, then a doctrine of forum law determina-
tion is unnecessary. The concurrence felt that the convention itself
provided a substantive standard which limits the forum state's ability
to determine whether service abroad is required on the facts of a par-
ticular case. 0
2
V. ANALYSIS
A. Has the Court Created a Legally Indefensible Doctrine?
The first area where the Court has left itself open to criticism is
in the future application of the Schlunk forum law determination doc-
99. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2111 (1988).
100. Id. at 2116. Note that ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-204 (1985) provide, in part:
"A private corporation may be served (1) by leaving a copy of the process with its registered
agent or any officer or agent of the corporation found anywhere within the State; or (2) in any
other manner now or hereafter provided by law." Apparently, this statute makes no attempt
to define "within," let alone "service abroad," which is why the Illinois courts focused on the
agency issue.
101. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2116.
102. Id. at 2112, 2115.
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trine. In order to be most useful in its application, a legal rule should
distinguish one factual situation from another in such a way that the
result both comports with notions of justice and furthers public policy
on the issue presented. In this case, the problem of producing a just
result requires reconciling notions of fair notice to the defendant with
(1) jurisprudential concerns over unnecessary imposition of federal
law on the states, and (2) the international politicai reality uf a ..- U_
ing treaty. The public policy problem involves practical concerns
over what standards foreign defendants (often corporations) should be
required to meet in order to effectively challenge service (usually at-
tempted by a sole United States plaintiff).
To understand why the Schlunk case does not further either of
those concerns, it is necessary to examine the possible service situa-
tions to which it can apply. A proper level of abstraction should
cover all the possibilities. These abstractions will be labeled Situa-
tions One, Two and Three. For analytical purposes, it is important to
note that a foreign defendant may well have presence in the United
States sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction on a United States
court, but lack the presence to be served process. It is the presence
for service of process with which we are concerned.
Situation One involves a United States plaintiff serving a foreign
defendant who has no presence, actually or through an agent, in the
United States at the time of service. The suit might cover a tort or a
breach of contract which occurred while the defendant was in the
United States. Or perhaps the action arose while the plaintiff was in
the defendant's home country. A classic Situation One example
would involve a breach of contract by a foreign businessman (with no
agents or offices in the United States) with a United States plaintiff,
where the plaintiff attempts to serve the defendant in the defendant's
native country.
Situation Two involves a United States plaintiff serving a foreign
defendant who is actually present in the United States at the time of
service. Again, the action may have arisen in any jurisdiction. The
factual example in Situation One would become Situation Two if the
defendant decided to remain in the United States, and the plaintiff
had effectively served the defendant in the United States.
Situation Three involves a United States plaintiff serving a for-
eign defendant whose presence in the United States at the time of
service is uncertain. The most common reason for uncertainty as to
"presence" may be the issue of whether the defendant has an agent in
[Vol. 12:317
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the United States. Unlike Situations One and Two, wherever the ac-
tion may have arisen, the problem in Situation Three is determining
where and how to serve process on the defendant or the defendant's
agent. The Schlunk case itself is, as demonstrated by the factual rec-
ord in the Illinois courts, an example of Situation Three.
Assuming that the Hague Convention is in force, there is no
doubt as to the outcome of the case in Situations One and Two. The
plaintiff in Situation One must serve the defendant "abroad," mandat-
ing use of the Convention. The plaintiff in Situation Two does not
need the Convention, because service will be accomplished in the
United States. Both decisions are based on a factual inquiry to deter-
mine the status of the defendant. There are two options for Situation
Three. Either agency law must be abolished in service cases, or Situa-
tion Three must be re-classified as either a Situation One or a Situa-
tion Two in order to arrive at a decision on how service should be
accomplished. It seems most logical to re-classify Situation Three,
since Situation Three only exists until a legal determination of pres-
ence is made.
Both the Illinois courts and the United States Supreme Court
determined that the Schlunk case was actually a Situation Two case.
The difference in opinion is that the Illinois courts made the decision
on the basis of a factual inquiry, whereas the Supreme Court re-
framed the inquiry as a legal one. Until the Schlunk case, the inquiry
has indeed been factual. The doctrine enunciated in Mullane recog-
nized that although different jurisdictions may promulgate different
methods of service on principals and agents, a uniform Constitutional
test would prevent lawmakers from manipulating the law to suit the
facts of a particular case, or class of cases. The Schlunk forum law
determination doctrine seems to suggest that, rather than following
Mullane, the inquiry should be the interpretation of the statute of the
forum state. The inconsistency in the Court's reasoning is apparent: a
factual inquiry has been transformed into a legal one without a
reason. 103
Of course, the law is not always perfectly consistent. Forum law
determination may be categorized as a departure from established
law, but does the new doctrine serve a useful purpose? The Schlunk
case, as the majority admitted, would have yielded the same result,
namely, inapplicability of the Convention, had a standard due process
103. The Court made no attempt to distinguish Mullane, and in fact claimed to embrace it
as part of the new test. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
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test been applied. °0 This is so because the factual inquiry of whether
VWAG was present in Illinois was resolved by both the Illinois courts
and members of the Supreme Court in Schlunk's favor. Several
courts had ruled that the doctrine of forum law determination (or any
new doctrine) was not necessary to resolve this case. Thus, the ques-
tion is: Can a factual situation arise in the United States where an
application of the Schiunk forum law determination doctrine clarifies
or advances the law of service of process? In other words, does the
Schlunk forum law determination doctrine make it any easier to re-
classify Situation Three cases?
The answer to both questions is "no." The development of
United States law has yielded a strong connection between service of
process and notice, a connection which has been settled since Mullane
in 1950.105 There can be no doubt that in the United States, whatever
method of service is used, there is no escaping the notice requirements
of due process. Moreover, the history of the United States' participa-
tion in the Convention suggests that the Convention was an effort to
internationally codify service and notice.10 6 In Schlunk, the Supreme
Court did not overrule Mullane, or limit Mullane's applicability to
the instances of agency, or limit Mullane's application in international
situations. Instead, the Court has added a useless step to the interna-
tional service of process analysis.
For instance, before Schlunk, an attorney or judge with a
Schlunk/Situation Three case would analyze it according to the fol-
lowing test. First, the attorney would determine if the defendant had
an agent in the United States. If so, the defendant would be "present"
factually, and thus amenable to service under Mullane, because the
defendant would receive notice. Essentially, this would be the same
method used in analyzing service on any out-of-state defendant. If
the defendant was not "present," or if the question was too close to
call, the attorney might simply rely on the Convention. In either case,
the final determination would be made by applying due process stan-
dards to the facts of the case. If the defendant was not present and
104. Id.
105. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Greene v.
Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982), the Supreme Court applied the Mullane analysis to a Kentucky
statute which authorized service by posting. The Court held that on the facts, posting did not
provide adequate notice. Id. at 453. See Greenbaum, The Postman Never Rings Twice. The
Constitutionality of Service by Process by Posting after Greene v. Lindsey, 33 AM. U.L. REV.
601 (1983). Greene provides a good domestic illustration of the underlying constitutional test
necessary in every service situation.
106. See B. RISTAU, supra note 47, at 4-7.
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would not receive notice, the Convention would apply because service
would have to be sent abroad.
In contrast, after Schlunk, a Situation Three case would be ana-
lyzed in a different way. As a new first step, the internal law of the
forum should be examined to see if service on an agent of the defend-
ant is somehow "defined" as service which is "not abroad." However,
as a second step, the attorney must go through the same constitu-
tional due process analysis as above, because the forum law determi-
nation doctrine does not relieve service of process from Mullane
liability. 107 The laws of the states may vary, and may make no at-
tempt to define "service abroad,"10 8 so an attorney who reads Schlunk
literally will likely perform an extra first step needlessly. Moreover, a
narrow reading of a state service statute which does not provide no-
tice to a defendant may run afoul of Mullane requirements, and may
result in a delay while service is re-executed.
Perhaps a given State, which chooses to draft a service statute
hostile to foreign companies, might attempt to make "the new first
step" created by Schlunk worthwhile' °9 to a United States plaintiff.
Given the goals of notice embedded in both the Convention and
United States law, however, can a situation where a state could define
"service abroad" so as to completely block the transmission of docu-
ments abroad even exist unless it comported with due process? The
answer is that it cannot. If the Supreme Court had decided to exempt
107. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112 (1988).
108. For example, prior to 1984, Section 413.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
made no mention of the Convention, but simply stated that service could be accomplished,
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute... (a) Within this state, as provided by this chapter
[or] ... ; (c) Outside the United States, as provided in this chapter or as directed by the court
in which the action is pending, or, if the court before or after service finds that the service is
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, as prescribed by the law of the place where the
person is served ...."
In 1984, the California legislature amended Section 413.10(c) to include the sentence:
"These rules are subject to the provisions of the Convention on the 'Service Abroad of Judicial
and Extrajudicial Documents' in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention)."
However, other sections of the California Codes remained unchanged. For instance, Corpora-
tions Code Section 25550 allows service on a foreign corporation to be made by leaving a copy
of the process with the Commissioner of Corporations, provided the plaintiff also mails a copy
of the process to the defendant or "takes other steps which are reasonably calculated to give
actual notice .... To the California attorney who wishes to know whether the Convention
applies, it is no answer to say "look to state law." The crucial question, as illustrated by
Section 25550's incorporation of the Mullane standard, is whether "notice reasonably calcu-
lated to give actual notice" requires transmission of documents abroad.
109. "Worthwhile" in the sense of making service on an agent easier for the domestic
plaintiff, and notice more difficult to obtain for the foreign defendant.
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Situation Three cases from the Mullane rule, perhaps many service
statutes could be drafted which would effectively define "service
abroad." However, as long as Mullane remains good law, due process
will ultimately determine whether or not a given defendant is "pres-
ent" in a forum. If the defendant is not present in the forum, nothing
in Schlunk indicates that service would then be anything other than
"abroad," and the Convention would apply.
Thus, as the concurrence observed,' 10 the attorney in this situa-
tion will finish analytically where he started-not because of a partic-
ular reading of the forum's law, but because the forum's law is always
subject to due process analysis. The obvious problems involved in re-
defining Situation Three cases have not been answered, but rather
have been avoided. In the end, as long as the due process analysis
remains part of the test for sufficiency of the service technique, it will
be impossible for the forum law determination doctrine to "deter-
mine" anything.
B. Forum Law Determination and the Supremacy Clause
The problem spawned by the forum law determination doctrine
was not the only problem that made the classification of Situation
Three service problems more confusing. The Court in Schlunk noted
that: "By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, United States Constitution,
Article VI, the Convention pre-empts inconsistent methods of service
prescribed by state law in all cases to which it applies."' This state-
ment is correct, but perhaps was forgotten by the Court when it an-
nounced its doctrine of forum law determination. The result of the
doctrine is that all fifty states may decide for themselves the scope of
application of a United States treaty."12 This is completely contrary
to the Supremacy Clause.
State law may conflict with the Supremacy Clause in two ways.
First, the state law may conflict directly with the federal law such that
compliance with both laws is impossible." 3 Second, conflict also ex-
110. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2116 (Brennan, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 2108.
112. The power of the federal government to encroach, by treaty, into areas of law nor-
mally reserved to the states has been settled since Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Moreover, because the Convention has been ratified by the Senate, the "executive agreement as
a treaty" concerns of United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203 (1942) do not arise.
113. See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913). See also L. TRIBE, supra
note 15, at 481.
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ists when "state action undermines a congressional decision in favor
of national uniformity of standards."' 14
In the instant case, it is possible that the forum law determina-
tion doctrine will lead to differences among the states concerning
what factual situations trigger the Convention. Such differences will
arise if individual states read Schlunk as limiting or de-emphasizing
the Mullane rule in cases involving foreign corporations. When Con-
gress ratified the Convention, they could not have intended that its
scope and applicability should be decided by each state. The Conven-
tion's purpose was to promote international standards of service, not
to give signatory countries the freedom to allow jurisdictional subdivi-
sions free reign over the decision of when the Convention would
apply.
The forum law determination doctrine may lead to non-uniform
standards among the states regarding international service of process
abroad, a result which conflicts with congressional purpose. When
such a conflict exists, the state law should be pre-empted by virtue of
the Supremacy Clause. As the Court has left it, state law now con-
trols a treaty of the United States, a situation which both the
Supremacy Clause and the Treaty Clause were designed to prevent.
Had the Court held that factual inquiry guided by due process stan-
dards of notice was the appropriate test to determine the "presence"
of the defendant, this tension between federal and state law would
have been avoided.
C. Adequate Notice to United States Defendants in Foreign Cases
The Court stated: "Where service on a domestic agent is valid
and complete under both state law and the Due Process Clause, our
inquiry ends and the Convention has no further implications." '" 5
This assertion may be true, but what of its effect on a foreign court's
reading of the United States' commitment to the Convention? If the
Supreme Court has decided that individual states may legislate on the
applicability of the Convention, and potentially limit its application,
are foreign jurisdictions likely to say, "since their due process analysis
will produce the same result, let's not worry that they have ruled the
Convention non-applicable upon an interpretation of state law?"
While this might be the response of the other convention members,
114. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). See also L. TRIBE, supra
note 15, at 486.
115. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2112.
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another response could well be retaliation through the passage of laws
which would severely limit notice to United States defendants.,
1 6
Simply because the Supreme Court indicated it was "unlikely"
that any foreign state would try to "circumvent" the Convention,1 7
should United States corporations doing business abroad not be con-
cerned? Perhaps this question is one of the rare questions that is best
answered with a question: If we could rely on the judgment of foreign
legal systems to provide adequate notice to United States defendants,
why did we participate so eagerly in the ratification of the Convention
in the first place? It is perhaps relevant that at least four countries-
West Germany, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom-were in-
terested enough in the Schlunk case to respond by sending diplomatic
notes to the State Department.
11 8
Perhaps the concern that foreign jurisdictions may actually legis-
late against the Convention is unrealistic. But in an age in which the
world of international commerce is an increasingly important medium
through which countries compete, a wiser choice would be to heed the
warning of the concurrence, which points out that "after today's deci-
sion [foreign] ... courts will surely sympathize little with any United
116. For example, in the recent battle over extraterritorial discovery, other countries have
not hesitated to pass "blocking statutes" which provide for criminal penalties for parties who
submit to direct discovery requests from United States plaintiffs. See generally G. BORN & D.
WESTIN, supra note 20, at 282-325.
117. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2111.
118. Brief for petitioner at 10-12, Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104
(1988).
The Federal Republic of Germany stated in a note verbale dated January 22, 1987
that the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court is "likely to have serious adverse
effects on international litigation in civil and commercial matters" and is "in conflict
with the letter and spirit of the Convention and ignores its mandatory character."
The note further explained:
[slerving process on a domestic subsidiary of a foreign corporation frustrates the
declared purpose of the Hague Service Convention which is to ensure that documents
"be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time" and... in its language,
so as to enable a foreign defendant to defend an action in a foreign language and over
a distance of several thousand miles.
The Government of Japan also filed a diplomatic note stating that it "shares the common
concerns expressed by the Note dated January 22, 1987, addressed to the Department of State
by the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany." Id. at 11. The Government of France
filed a similar diplomatic protest on April 7, 1987. Id. The United Kingdom filed a diplomatic
protest as well, stating that "in this instance, where service necessarily involves the transmis-
sion of documents abroad, the Convention must be construed in the liberal spirit in which it
was intended, in order to mitigate the inconsistencies and hardships that the drafters sought to
redress." Id. at 12. These letters indicate that foreign governments indeed are concerned with
the Schlunk decision which allows individual states to interpret the Convention.
Service of Process Abroad
States national pleading that a judgment violates the Convention
"9119
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Court's reasoning seems to suggest that state
courts can define the term "service abroad," that determination will
inevitably be decided, not by statute, but by a due process analysis.
Accordingly, any attorney who relies on service on an agent under a
state statute alone risks having such service invalidated by a due pro-
cess appeal, or worse, having a foreign court refuse to enforce a judg-
ment because of enmity to the Schlunk doctrine. Moreover, despite
the Court's pronouncement of a new doctrine, all of the practical and
policy rationales which favor the use of the Convention still apply, so
the prudent attorney should continue to use the Convention. Unfor-
tunately, as a result of this decision, United States defendants may
find other countries increasingly unwilling to follow the Convention
when foreign plaintiffs serve appointed agents of United States nation-
als abroad.
The better approach would have been to leave out any new "fo-
rum law determination" test and allow our own constitutional due
process standards to dictate when service abroad is required. Analyti-
cally, it is now necessary to go through a two-step test to determine
whether or not a particular factual situation triggers use of the Con-
vention. First, the attorney must consult the forum law to see how
service is performed in that particular fact situation. Assuming that
forum law allows service on an agent or substitute service by mail, it
may appear unnecessary to use the Convention. However, as a sec-
ond step, the attorney must turn to the Mullane due process test to
determine if service abroad is constitutionally mandated. Because due
process concerns cannot be avoided, this second test is mandatory.
On the other hand, if the Schlunk test had never been formu-
lated, it would take only one step to decide whether to use the Con-
vention. A more realistic approach is to declare the Convention per se
applicable to any situation involving service of documents to a foreign
defendant located abroad. The Convention could only be circum-
vented by a showing that under due process, service would be com-
plete on the defendant's agent in the United States, with no
transmission abroad required. This latter situation actually occurred
119. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. at 2117 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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in Schlunk, and the analysis of the lower state courts was correct in its
application of a due process standard.
Perhaps, as the concurrence pointed out, the forum law determi-
nation test may "have little practical consequence."'' 20 Nevertheless,
a prospective service on an overseas defendant should be handled with
care, for service and sufficiency of notice will undoubtedly continue to
be challenged by detendants the world over.
Henry J. Moravec
120. Id. at 2116.
